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- Behavioral economics and bounds on rationality
Behavioral economics and bounds on rationality
-
Olivier Compte, ingénieur en chef des Ponts et Chaussées
(
PSE
)
Cet enseignant est référent pour cette UE
- Philippe Jehiel, ingénieur en chef des Ponts et Chaussées ( PSE )
S'il s'agit de l'enseignement principal d'un enseignant, le nom de celui-ci est indiqué en gras.
Du 3 septembre 2018 au 14 janvier 2019, horaires et lieu fixés ultérieurement
PART I (Jehiel)
The modern approach to solution concepts in games is by a learning story. Players may have wrong expectations (either about the opponent’s play or about the assessment of their own strategy) to start with, but as experience accumulates expectations should get closer to the truth: if behaviors stabilize they should correspond to an equilibrium play. However, this view (at least applied in a strict sense) seems less plausible in complex games. Think of chess. Predicting what the opponent will do in more than a few steps ahead is impractical. Knowing or learning the value of a board position is impossible (for most positions), even for the best chess players. Such simple considerations suggest the need to develop models of bounded rationality, which may next be used to approach a number of economic interactions in a new way. The objective of the course is to stimulate new research in game theory and applications that maintains the game theoretic tradition of high logical standards while incorporating elements of bounded rationality/behavioral economics in the analysis. Various approaches to behavioral economics and bounded rationality are discussed in the course.
Part II (Compte)
The objective of the class is to take a critical journey across economic theory (decision theory under uncertainty, auctions, repeated games, reputation, information transmission...).
Our models generally assume that agents now with precision the environment they face, or the exact distributions over the parameters that the analyst assumes. This places strong cognitive demands on agents, or it gives agents extraordinary powers of discernment. Our aim will be to identify these cognitive demands, highlight how our intuitions are shaped by (and sometimes hinge on) these demands, and suggest alternative models that assume lesser sophistication on agents.
Along the way, we shall also review how the path proposed, based on direct strategy restrictions, compete with other methods for limiting the rationality of economic agents.
Ce séminaire est enseigné en anglais.
36 h, 6 ECTS
Mots-clés : Économie,
Suivi et validation pour le master : Spécial : cf. le descriptif
- Analyse et politique économiques
(Séminaire de recherche M2S3 )
Intitulés généraux :
Renseignements :
mentions APE et PPD, secrétariat pédagogique, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, tél. : 01 80 52 19 43/44. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez écrire à : master-ape(at)psemail.eu
Réception :
du lundi au mardi de 15 h 30 à 17 h 30 et du jeudi au vendredi de 10 h à 12 h 30.
Adresse(s) électronique(s) de contact : master-ape(at)psemail.eu
Dernière modification de cette fiche par le service des enseignements (sg12@ehess.fr) : 5 juillet 2018.
Réalisation : Direction des Systèmes d'Information
[Accès réservé]